Most people will have never read a single article of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) before they stumbled recently across Article 50. Alas, those 'most people' seems to include many British lawyers and politicians whose acquaintance with the constitution of the European Union has been hitherto remote. So here is my guide to Article 50. The need to include a secession clause in the draft Constitutional Treaty (2003) and then the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) was upheld both by the federalists and by their opponents. Federalists saw the need to have a safety clause in the new treaty that would allow a let-out for any current member state which fought shy of accepting the leap forward in European integration that was at that time hoped for. Some, including the Germans, worried that the decision to allow competences to be returned to member states (now Article 48(2) TEU) postulated a future less-integrated Union from which it would be necessary to escape. The UK government, aware of the risky nature of its ever-increasing exceptionalism, wanted a clause that would prevent its abrupt expulsion as an awkward member state by the mainstream majority. The President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing himself added in the two-year timetable in which the secession agreement would have to be completed. That said, none of us in the Convention ever expected the provision actually to be used -which might explain its relatively sketchy character. So it is vital to analyse very carefully what the clause says, why it says it, and how it is to be deployed now that the UK voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the Union. If the European Court of Justice (CJEU) is asked to verify that the UK has acted 'in accordance with its own constitutional requirements', it will look at the British EU Referendum Act 2015, which legislated that a referendum 'is to be held' on whether the UK should remain a member of the EU. 1 No threshold was set in the legislation either for turnout or for a qualified majority. Although it is said by some Remainers, still in denial about the result of the vote, that the referendum was 'merely advisory', the Act made no stipulation for the UK Parliament to approve, deny or secondguess the outcome of the referendum. The CJEU will note that the majority at 3.8% was clear and the turnout at 72.2% was higher than that of the 2015 general election. The Article 50 exercise itself will be to a large extent the converse of how a state joins the EU. Just as accession (under Article 49 TEU) is not so much a negotiation between the candidate country and the EU but more the assimilation of the acquis communautaire and verification of conformity with the Copenhagen criteria, the secession process will be about cutting the ties that bind the UK to the constitutional order of the EU after 43 years of integration. It is a complex business, even poignant, but it is fairly straightforward.
Theagreementwillneedtorecordallthematters that will then be left up to the EU and the UK themselves to execute in detail subsequently and respectively. For its part, the EU legislature will have to shrink its budget and adjust its institutions -such as the re-apportionment of the UK's 73 seats in the European Parliament (one hopes to a transnational list). EU treaty amendment and other adjustments to primary law are unavoidable. The UK government and parliament, for their part, will be engaged for years with filleting the laws they have previously enacted that transpose EU law into the domestic arena. Much will need to be repealed quickly, including the European Parliament Elections Act 2002 and the European Union Act 2011. For the sake of legal certainty, the final repeal of the EC Act 1972 will surely have to be made to coincide with the entry into force of the Article 50 withdrawal agreement.
There is press speculation about a turf war in Brussels between the European Council and Commission over the conduct of the Article 50 exercise. This is unnecessary. The European Council will establish the mandate for the Commission to do the detailed work on behalf of the EU. Didier Seeuws has been appointed to run a special Council committee to oversee the process, including the reflection on any future framework, but the heavy-lifting on secession will be done by the Commission under the direction of Michel Barnier. The imposition of the guillotine after two years has two purposes. First, it will prevent the UK from endless procrastination and prevarication -a useful precaution, indeed, in present political circumstances. For the EU 27, already bruised by David Cameron's sham 'renegotiation' extracted from the European Council in February, further delay and uncertainty is unacceptable. 3 In one sense, Brexit is just an enormous distraction from dealing with the plentiful other crises that now confront the Union. The departure of the British may make it easier to address at least some of those questions, notably deeper fiscal integration in the eurozone. 4 Likewise, EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.
From the British point of view, the timetable of two years gives a decent breathing space. It is not possible for the UK to be ejected peremptorily from the EU by its aggrieved partners. Within that two year period -for instance, following a British general election and change of government or, less likely, after a second referendum -it would be perfectly possible for the UK to revoke its decision to quit. That Article 50 is silent on the matter of revocation does not mean that a change of direction would be illegal under EU law (as long as the CJEU were convinced that the switch was constitutional). The EU is well practised in the art of the stopped clock. Precedent, coupled with the duty upon all member states to act with 'sincere cooperation' (Article 4(2) TEU), suggests that a British revocation of Article 50 would be accepted. Given the collateral damage done to the remaining EU by Brexit, a notification that London had changed its mind would be met with very great, if somewhat exasperated relief. In public as in private life, second thoughts are often preferable to first. Clearly, Article 50 stacks the cards in favour of the EU 27 -as the EU 27 summit meeting on 29 June duly affirmed. Brexit will not be made easy; and the UK cannot expect better conditions as an ex-member state than it had as a full member state. The UK is to be deprived of its full rights as a member state, as was reflected by the prompt resignation of Jonathan Hill as a member of the European Commission. The depletion of credibility of the remaining Brits in Brussels, not only within the Council, will be illustrated in a number of ways, big and small, over the course of the next weeks and months.
The qualified majority needed in Council to approve the withdrawal agreement will be 20 out of the 27 states. The withdrawal agreement will also have to be approved by the UK parliament as well as by the European Parliament (where British MEPs will retain full voting rights until the day the Article 50 agreement enters into force). But it is not envisaged that the EU 27 will have to submit necessarily the agreement to their own national parliaments for ratification or, God forbid, to referendums. That is why a narrow, technical and fairly swift agreement such as we have described here is much preferable to a wider and longer negotiation that attempted to embrace a full, final settlement of the EU-UK relationship: such a thing will be a mixed agreement under the terms of Article 218 TFEU, and will certainly be subject to unanimous ratification by all 27 states, running the gauntlet of veto. Article 50 it is. And if it were done, it were best done quickly.
